Emeritus Research and Publications

This is a collection of UM-Flint Philosophy Department Emeritus faculty publications, including books, chapters in edited anthologies, and selected journal articles.

Books by Dr. Charles E. M. Dunlop, David M. French Professor Emeritus and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy

Glossary of Cognitive Science

The Paragon House Glossary Series is designed to address the urgent needs of students and professors in subject areas that are evolving so rapidly that it has become difficult to keep up with new discoveries, methodologies, and critiques. This compendium of 433 entries, ranging from 25 to 250 words in length, offers a thorough guide to the specialized terms used in one of the most exciting and fastest growing areas of intellectual inquiry.



Philosophical Essays on Dreaming

The study of dreaming has excited philosophers for centuries, and the past few decades have significantly advanced our understanding of the subject. This book is a collection of the most important philosophical articles on dreaming that have appeared in the past thirty years. Included are papers by such well-known figures as A.J. Ayer, Norman Malcom, and David F. Pears. 

The sixteen essays address the topics of dreaming and skepticism, the relationship of dreams to perceptions, the concept of dreaming, and the relevance of contemporary dream research to philosophy. In the course of their discussion, the contributors bring out important connections between philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and theories of meaning. Thus, besides confronting a subject of considerable intrinsic interest, this book provides a case study of a meeting point between philosophy and psychology, and several branches of philosophy. 

Professor Dunlop contributes a substantial introduction tracing many of these connections and relating the articles to each other in a systematic and coherent fashion. He also includes a critical appraisal of many of the arguments, and furnishes background material, particularly on the philosophical views of Norman Malcom and on the recent discoveries in sleep laboratories.

Computerization and Controversy, First Edition

How computers will change the world, both technologically and socially, has been the subject of many debates. This collection of essays doesn't try to predict the changes; instead, it clarifies the areas of controversy and brings up a range of possible futures rather than one predicted future.





Book Chapters by Dr. Charles E. M. Dunlop, David M. French Professor Emeritus and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy

Encyclopedia of Computer Science, 4th Edition

Edited by Anthony Ralston, Edwin D. Reilly, and David Hemmendinger 

Chapter Title: "Computer Ethics" 

Computer ethics is the study of moral concepts, principles, and reasoning, applied in contexts that involve computers in some essential way. The stipulation "essential" rules out situations that raise the same ethical issues that would be raised if a computer were not involved. Morally, for example, the theft or wanton destruction of a computer is on a par with stealing or destroying a bicycle or a piano. In other circumstances, as will be discussed, computers do create distinct moral quandaries.

Epistemology and Cognition

Edited by J.H. Fetzer 

Chapter Title: "Conceptual Dependency as the Language of Thought" 

Roger Schank's research in AI takes seriously the ideas that understanding natural language involves mapping its expressions into an internal representation scheme and that these internal representations have a syntax appropriate for computational operations. It therefore falls within the computational approach to the study of mind. This paper discusses certain aspects of Schank's approach in order to assess its potential adequacy as a (partial) model of cognition. This version of the Language of Thought hypothesis encounters some of the same difficulties that arise for Fodor's account.


Philosophical Psychology

"Mentalese Semantics and the Naturalized Mind" 

In a number of important works, Jerry Fodor has wrestled with the problem of how mental representation can be accounted for within a physicalist framework. His favored response has attempted to identify nonintentional conditions for intentionality, relying on a nexus of casual relations between symbols and what they represent. I examine Fodor's theory and argue that it fails to meet its own conditions for adequacy insofar as it presupposes the very phenomenon that it purports to account for. I conclude, however, that the ontological commitments of intentional psychology survive within a broader conception of naturalism than the one adopted by Fodor.

Philosophical Psychology

"Searle's Unconcious Mind" 

In his bookThe rediscovery of the mind John Searle claims that unconscious mental states (1) have first-person "aspectual shape", but (2) that their ontology is purely third-person. He attempts to eliminate the obvious inconsistency by arguing that the aspectual shape of unconscious mental states consists in their ability to cause conscious first-person states. However, I show that this attempted solution fails insofar as it covertly acknowledges that unconscious states lack the aspectual shape required for them to play a role in psychological explanation.

The Information Society

"Controversies about Computerization and the Character of White Collar Worklife" 

The way that computerization changes white collar work is the subject of significant controversies in the research and professional communities. This paper examines some of the key controversies about the way that computerization influences patterns of coordination control in workplaces, including monitoring. It examines debates about upskilling and deskilling, and the role of organizational infrastructure in making computerized systems more usable. It also examines the ways that computerization might foster new forms of work organization.


"Conceptual Dependency as the Language of Thought" 

Roger Schank's research in AI takes seriously the ideas that understanding natural language involves mapping its expressions into an internal representation scheme and that these internal representations have a syntax appropriate for computational operations. It therefore falls within the computational approach to the study of mind. This paper discusses certain aspects of Schank's approach in order to assess its potential adequacy as a (partial) model of cognition. This version of the Language of Thought hypothesis encounters some of the same difficulties that arise for Fodor's account.


"Wittgenstein on Sensation and 'Seeing-As'" 

Although Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind has given rise to a vast body of critical literature, his discussion of sensation has so far received only piecemeal treatment. In fact, the focus of commentators has been so much on the private-language argument that it may appear as if Wittgenstein had little else to say relevant to the topic of sensation. Although I shall of course pay heed to that argument, my main concern is to sketch an overview of Wittgenstein's approach to sensation. One special virtue I should like to claim for it is that it provides some important thematic continuity between the two parts of thePhilosophical Investigations. Another feature is that it avoids imputing to Wittgenstein various traditional philosophical doctrines which some of his critics, as well as some of his followers, claim to find in the later writings.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy

"Kim's Supervenient Mind" 

The point of departure for much work in the philosophy of mind is the acknowledgment that mental events exist and interact with bodily events. The problem has been to explain how this is possible. A very natural approach to the issue at some point invokes psychological correlation laws, which specify a nomological connection between mental events and their neural correlates. Even dualists may grant this much, in an effort to show how dualist-interactionism comports with a Humean view of causation. And identity theories have typically taken psychological correlation laws to be an important part of their reductionist program. Thus, from a variety of viewpoints, psycho-physical correlation laws appear as essential ingredients in an account of psychophysical causation. Jaegwon Kim, however, has recently argued that “Far from resolving the problem of psychophysical causation, the existence of psychophysical correlation laws can be seen to generate the problem of psychophysical causation in a new form”. I want first to outline the “new form” of the problem as Kim sees it, and then to discuss his proposed solution.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

"Belief in Dreams" 

The view of dreaming that has come to be called 'Cartesian' maintains that dreams consist of experiences occurring in sleep. Since these (usually) nocturnal experiences are said often to resemble waking perceptions, and at least sometimes to include (false) beliefs, it appears that the Cartesian account of dreaming can easily generate a sceptical argument concerning the external world. Such a position was recently endorsed by E. M. Curley, who drew on the findings of contemporary dream research in support of it. E Don Mannison, however, has since argued that Curley's conclusions are based on an unjustified assumption? I believe Mannison to be mistaken, and my aim irr what follows is to show why.


"Dreams, Skepticism, and Scientific Research" 

The topic of dreaming has received a good deal of attention in recent years, owing in large measure to a provocative paper by Margaret Macdonald and two publications by Norman Malcolm. Both Macdonald and Malcolm argue, from rather different directions, against the historically well-entrenched idea that dream states are sufficiently like waking states that we may mistake one for the other. Their strategy is to try to undermine Cartesian skepticism by arguing that there are radical conceptual disparities between dreaming and waking. If the 'anti-traditionalist' account of Macdonald and Malcolm could be established as correct, it would appear to follow that dream skepticism has no foothold. I shall argue, however, that purely conceptual considerations do not clearly favor the Macdonald-Malcolm theory, and that future experimental studies may refute it.

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

"Lehrer and Ellis on Incorrigibility" 

The issue of incorrigibility has long been of central importance to both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Although the number of incorrigibilists seems to have dwindled in recent years, a useful paper by Frank Jackson has sought to show that the incorrigibility thesis has not been refuted. My aim is to strengthen that conclusion by considering (and rejecting) two further arguments against the incorrigibility doctrine.


The New Scholasticism

"Anamnesis in thePhaedo" 

My intention in this article is to examine Plato's doctrine of Recollection as it appears in thePhaedo. It is true, of course, that the theory occurs in other dialogues-explicitly in theMeno andPhaedrus, and implicitly, as some commentators would have it, in theSymposium, Republic, Theaetetus, Timaeus andSeventh Epistle. My attention here, however, will be restricted to themes which can be addressed without much consideration of dialogues other than thePhaedo. I shall begin by reviewing Plato's presentation of the Recollection doctrine since, despite the familiarity of its general outlines, a purview of some details will be useful for the critical points I shall later develop. Part II will be addressed to an accusation which a recent commentator has leveled against Plato--namely, that thePhaedo embodies two mutually incompatible attitudes toward sense-perception. My concern in Part II will be to exonerate Plato of this charge.

Philosophical Studies

"Performatives and Dream Skepticism" 

An important contention in Norman Malcolm's monograph,Dreaming, was that skepticism about one's present state (Am I awake or dreaming?) is untenable. Malcolm's book has been thoroughly and effectively criticized from a number of vantage points, but implicit in it is one argument against skepticism which these criticisms leave unscathed. I wish to call attention to this facet of Malcolm's doctrine, and to argue against it.





Books by Dr. L. Nathan Oaklander, David M. French Professor Emeritus and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy

Presentism: Essential Readings

There is no time like the present. Is it also true that there is no time but the present? According to presentism, the present time is special in the most fundamental sense because all of reality is included in it. What is past is no longer; what is future is yet to be. This philosophy of time, with roots as far back as Saint Augustine and beyond, is the focus of vigorous and widespread discussion in contemporary philosophy. Presentism: Essential Readings brings together for the first time the seminal works by both presentists and their opponents. Works by Augustine, McTaggart, Prior, Craig and others, address a wide array of issues concerning presentism. How can time pass if everything is present? Is there no future to come to the present; nor a past to receive the present? How can there be truths about the past? Generally a statement is true because of events in reality. But if presentism is correct, then the past would seem to lack a basis in reality. If only the present is real, how can things last? To persist seems to require that something exist at more than one time, but presentism holds that there is only one time: the present. The collected essays on presentism address these and other aspects of the debate - a debate that is just beginning. With explanatory introductions written by the editors, Presentism: Essential Essays will fascinate and stretch the minds of both scholars and novices alike.

Tempo E Identità

Translated by Giovanni Iorio Giannoli 

Tutto persiste e sembra conservare la propria identità attraverso il tempo, malgrado ogni cambiamento. L'analisi di Oaklander parte da interrogativi che attraversano l'intera storia della filosofia e che vengono riformulati nei termini della filosofia analitica contemporanea. Pur ammettendo che la metafisica non è in grado dì fornire risposte definitive a problemi di questo genere, Oaklander si impegna a fornire argomenti che non siano in contrasto con ciò che la scienza ci dice rispetto alla natura delle cose e al ruolo del tempo.

The Philosophy of Time

What is the nature of temporal passage—the movement of events or moments of time from the future through the present into the past? Is the future and the past as real as the present, or is the present—or perhaps the present and the past—all that exists? What role, if any, does language play in giving us an insight into temporal reality? Is it possible to travel through time into distant regions of the future or the past? What accounts for the direction of time, the sense we have that we are moving toward the future and not back into the past? What is the relation between the physics of time and the philosophy of time? 

These are the kind of dizzying questions that have been addressed by metaphysicians since antiquity, and time has remained a critical concept for many thinkers and philosophers since then (for instance, in his Confessions, St Augustine, restating an observation by Plotinus, wrote: 'So what is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I seek to explain it, I do not'). Interest in the subject has also been enduring—and has blossomed anew in the past century. 

The Philosophy of Time is a new title in the Routledge series, Critical Concepts in Philosophy. It meets the need for an authoritative reference work to make sense of the subject's vast literature and the continuing explosion in research output. Edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, a leading scholar in the philosophy of time, this new Major Work from Routledge brings together in four volumes the canonical and the very best cutting-edge scholarship in the field to provide a synoptic view of all the key issues and current debates. 

With a comprehensive introduction to the collection, newly written by the editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, The Philosophy of Time is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by philosophers of time—as well as those working in related areas of philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of religion—as a vital research resource.

C.D. Broad's Ontology of Mind

C. D. Broad's writing on various philosophical issues spans more than half a century. Rather than attempt to trace the development of his thought throughout these fifty years this book considers his most representative work, namely, "The Mind and Its Place in Nature". Nor does the scope of this study encompass the whole of that book, but only some of the issues he discusses in it. Specifically, Oaklander considers what Broad has to say about such fundamental issues as substance, universals, relations, space, time, and intentionality in the contexts of perception, memory and introspection.


Metaphysics: Classic and Contemporary Readings

One of the most acclaimed introductions to Metaphysics in recent history, Hoy and Oaklander'sMETAPHYSICS: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS--now, by popular demand, in a second edition--continues to provide teachers and students with a balanced approach of both classic and contemporary voices. Using time as a unifying theme and constantly examining the interplay between scientific development and philosophical thinking,METAPHYSICS presents readings that have been especially chosen for their accessibility to undergraduates and provides them with exceptionally deep coverage of a crucial set of metaphysical topics.


The Ontology of Time

L. Nathan Oaklander is internationally recognised as a leading defender of the tenseless theory of time. The thirty-one essays by Oaklander in this very useful collection have helped shape recent discussions of temporal becoming, and are frequently cited in the literature on the philosophy of time. Philosophers who hold that there is temporal becoming - meaning that events are first future, then become present, and finally become past - are proponents of the "tensed" theory of time. By contrast, philosophers who claim that all successively ordered events have the same ontological status - meaning that events do not 'come into being' as such but merely exist 'without becoming' at their respective temporal locations - are proponents of the 'tenseless' theory of time. Oaklander's lucid exposition of the critical issues involved in the study of time make this book essential for students, scholars, and anyone interested in this complex area of philosophy.

The Importance of Time

The Importance of Time is a unique work that reveals the central role of the philosophy of time in major areas of philosophy. The first part of the book consists of symposia on two of the most important works in the philosophy of time over the past decade: Michael Tooley's Time, Tense, and Causation and D.H. Mellor's Real Time II. What characterizes these essays, and those that follow, are the interchanges between original papers, with original responses to them by commentators. The wide range of interrelated topics covered in this book is one of its most distinctive features. The book is divided into six parts: I. Book Symposia, II. Temporal Becoming, III. The Phenomenology of Time, IV. God, Time and Foreknowledge, V. Time and Physical Objects, and VI. Time and Causation, and contains 24 essays by leading philosophers in the various areas: Laurie Paul, Quentin Smith, L. Nathan Oaklander, Hugh Mellor, John Perry, William Lane Craig, Brian Leftow, Ned Markosian, Ronald C. Hoy, Michael Tooley, Storrs McCall, David Hunt, Mark Hinchliff, Robin Le Poidevin, Iain Martel and Eric M. Rubenstein.

Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics

This is the first introduction to metaphysics which is tied together by the idea of time. Time, Change and Freedom explores ideas such as whether there was a beginning of time and the possibility of an infinite past and an eternal future. It looks at what happens when things change, and what affect that has on us and our personal identity. The book also asks if we can be free and what is the relationship of human freedom to various theories of divine foreknowledge and determinism? The final part of the book brings students right up to date with theories of relativity and contemporary cosmology about time and the universe. Sections in Time, Change and Freedom cover: The Problem of Change God, Time and Freedom Relational and Substantival Theories of Time Tenseless Time Written in an engaging dialogue form, this book will explain the key themes of contemporary metaphysics, and at the same time the philosophy of time, to the beginner. It will be invaluable for all students on introductory philosophy courses, and for students interested in the philosophy of time and metaphysics.

The New Theory of Time

This book offers the latest turns in the debate over the new theory of time, with essays written by many of the most prominent contemporary thinkers in the philosophy of time. The Preface and the General Introduction to the book set the debate within the wider philosophical context and show why the subject of temporal becoming is a perennial concern of science, religion, language, logic, and the philosophy of mind.



Existentialist Philosophy: An Introduction (2nd Edition)

Introducing readers to existentialist philosophy through the writings of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, De Beauvoir and others, this unique anthology includes long selections from a relatively small number of existentialist thinkers — exploring each philosopher's views in great detail, and prefacing the essays with insightful introductions to help clarify material. Offers creative, explicative chapter introductions to help readers grasp material to be covered. Provides in-depth essays from select existentialist figures to allow a fuller view of each philosopher considered. Illustrates existentialist philosophy in literature with Jean-Paul Sartre's No Exit, Albert Camus' The Stranger, and Heidegger's Being and Time. Includes practical end-of-chapter glossaries to help readers with technical terms and unfamiliar jargon. Now presents thought-provoking study/discussion questions, as well as an updated bibliography. For those interested in existentialism, late 19th century thought, and the philosophy of religion.

Temporal Relations and Temporal Becoming

There are two different ways in which we ordinarily think and talk about time. On the one hand, we think of events in the world's history as being temporally related. On the other hand, we think of events as passing from the future into the present, and from the present into the past. To think of events in the second way is to conceive of them as temporally becoming. Philosophers have wondered which, if either, of these two ways of conceiving time is more fundamental. Although most of the recent books in the philosophy of time have been attempts to defend the becoming view, the aim of this work is to present systematic defense of Russellian theory of time according to which time consists solely of temporal relations between and among temporal objects. For courses in metaphysics, philosophy of time, and philosophical analysis.

Book Chapters by Dr. L. Nathan Oaklander, David M. French Professor Emeritus and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy

States of Affairs

Edited by Maria Reicher 

Chapter Title: "Time and Existence: A Critique of Degree Presentism"




Fostering the Ontological Turn: Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987)

Edited by Rosaria Egidi 

Chapter Title: "Is There a Difference Between Absolute and Relative Space"




Ontology and Analysis: Essays and Recollections about Gustav Bergmann

Edited by Laird Addis, Greg Jesson, and Erwin Tegtmeier 

Chapter Title: "Reminiscences of Bergmann's Last Student"



Time and History: Proceeding of the 28 International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria 2005

Edited by Friedrich Stadler, Michael Stöltzner (Editor) 

Chapter Title: "Wishing It Were Now Some Other Time"



Questions of Time and Tense

Edited by Robin Le Poidevin 

Chapter Title: "Freedom and the New Theory of Time"




Time, Tense, and Reference

Edited by Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith 

Chapter Title: "Two Versions of the New Theory of B-Language"




Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection

Edited by H. L. Dyke 

Chapter Title: "Personal Identity, Responsibility, and Time"




Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor

Edited by H. Lillehammer & G. Rodriguez Pereyra 

Chapter Title: "Presentism: A Critique"




Time, Reality and Experience

Edited by Craig Callender 

Chapter Title: "Presentism, Ontology and Temporal Experience"




Nietzsche (The International Library of Critical Essays in the History of Philosophy)

Edited by Richard White 

Chapter Title: "Nietzsche on Freedom"




Philosophy of Sex: Contemporary Readings

Edited by Alan Soble 

Chapter Title: "Sartre on Sex"




Selected Journal Articles by Dr. L. Nathan Oaklander, David M. French Professor Emeritus and Professor Emeritus of Philosophy


"McTaggart's Paradox and Crisp's Presentism" 

In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis of temporal becoming, temporal properties and temporal relations is inadequate. Finally, in Part III, I shall demonstrate that his presentist ontology of time is susceptible to the paradox he so assiduously sought to avoid.


Philosophy and Phenomenological Research

"Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to Craig" 

Recently William Lane Craig (2000, 2001) has attempted to resuscitate an argument, originally given by George Schlesinger (1980), against the tenseless or B-theory of time, according to which the only intrinsically temporal entities are the temporal relations of earlier ? later than and simultaneity. According to Craig, the objective reality of temporal becoming—the passage of time or events in time, from the future to the present and into the past—is implied by ''the experience of wishing it were now some other time; for example, '[Wishing that] it were now 1968!''' (2001, p. 160). For, following Schlesinger, Craig maintains when I wish that it were now some other time, what I am wishing for or what my wish is about is that the temporal particular, the NOW, or the temporal property of presentness, or some other metaphysical substitute for the property of presentness, be at some moment in the temporal series other than the moment at which it is now located. Since, however, on the B-theory there is no moving NOW and there are no suitable tenseless surrogates with the same meaning as the wish, Craig concludes that B-theorists must maintain that anyone who has such a wish (including B-theorists themselves since such a wish is commonplace) is to that extent irrational. Since Craig believes that the wish is rational and that the rationality of the wish can only be explained by appealing to the objectivity of tense and temporal becoming he infers that the experience in question is a strong argument for the A-theory and against the B-theory. But is the wish rational? And can it be explained only if an A-theoretic ontology is true? The aim of my paper is to explore those questions and in so doing provide a B-theoretic response to Craig's argument.



"B-time: a reply to Tallant" 

The aim of Jonathan Tallant's recent article 'What is B-time?' (2007) is to demonstrate that B-time – which holds that time consists solely of tenseless temporal relations – is something of which we have no understanding, and that, therefore, if mind-independent time is B-time, then time is unreal. Of course, implicit in his own position is that since time is plausibly real and we do understand what time is, the correct ontology of time is A-time or tensed time. How then does Tallant purport to substantiate the crucial claim that 'we have no understanding of what “B-time” is' (2007: 147)?



"Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage" 

In a recent paper, Steven Savitt attempts to demonstrate that there is an area of common ground between one classic proponent of temporal passage, C.D. Broad, and one classic opponent of passage, D.C. Williams. According to Savitt, Broad's notion of "absolute becoming" as the ordered occurrence of (simultaneity sets of) events, and Williams' notion of "literal passage," as the happening of events strung along the four-dimensional spacetime manifold, are indistinguishable. Savitt recognizes that some might think it preposterous to maintain that Broad and Williams agree regarding the nature of passage, but by a consideration of Broad's "Ostensible Temporality," and Williams' "The Myth of Passage," Savitt attempts to demonstrate that they do in fact hold the same, and indeed the correct, view of passage. I shall argue, however, that Broad's account of the transitory aspect of time is ontologically distinguishable from Williams' and that only by confusing Broad's A-theory with Williams' B-theory or Williams' B-theory with Broad's A-theory could Savitt have thought that there is an area of overlap between them. A demonstration of these points will have the benefit of enabling us to clarity the ontological character of the dispute, of which Broad was well-aware, between the A- and B-theories of time.



"Jokic on the Tensed Existence of Nature" 

In "The Tensed or Tensless Existence of Nature" Alexsander Jokic attempts to defend a new version A. N. Prior's "Thank Goodness It's Over" argument against my response to it. Jokic argues that we can give a non-circular account ofceasing to exist ~hat will vindicate the new reading, but I argue that his account to rescue Prior's argument against my criticism fails.




"McTaggart's Paradox Defended" 

No argument has done as much to stimulate debate in the philosophy of time as McTaggart's argument for the unreality of time. On the one side are A-theorists who believe McTaggart's positive thesis that time involves the A-series and temporal passage, but deny his negative thesis that the A-series and temporal passage are contradictory.2 On the other side are B-theorists who believe that McTaggart's positive conception of time is mistaken, but that his negative thesis is true.3 At least part of the reason why McTaggart's paradox has failed to convince defenders of passage is because they fail to appreciate his positive thesis and thereby misunderstand the rationale behind his negative thesis. The purpose of this paper is to prove that point. I shall proceed by first explicating what I take McTaggart's positive and negative theses to be. I shall then show how and why one recent response to McTaggart's paradox, which is representative of many, is unsuccessful because it misunderstands it. And finally, I will explain how a subsidiary benefit of my account of McTaggart's paradox is that it can provide a clear criterion for distinguishing passage from non-passage views of time.



"Personal Identity, Immortality, and the Soul" 

The soul has played many different roles in philosophy and religion. Two of the primary functions of the soul are the bearer of personal identity and the foundation of immortality. In this paper l shall consider different interpretations of what the soul has been taken to be and argue that however we interpret the soul we cannot consistently maintain the soul is both what we are and what continues after our bodily death.



Journal of Philosophical Research

"Is There a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A- and B-Time?" 

Clifford Williams has recently argued that the dispute between A- and B-theories, or tensed and tenseless theories of time, is spurious because once the confusions between the two theories are cleared away there is no real metaphysical difference between them. The purpose of this paper is to dispute Williams's thesis. I argue that there are important metaphysical differences between the two theories and that, moreover, some of the claims that Williams makes in his article suggest that he is sympathetic with a B-theoretic ontology.


The Modern Schoolman

"Loux on Particulars: Concrete or Bare" 

In his recent book, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, Michael Loux presents an argument against bare particulars, and offers an alternative Aristotelian account that takes concrete particulars to be basic or underived entities.1 We shall attempt to show that his argument against bare particulars fails, although it is exactly the same argument that can be raised against his own theory of Aristotelian substances. First, however, we must turn to the question, "What are bare particulars and why are they introduced?"